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Recent Developments 
Johnson v. State: 
Defense Attorney's Arrest for Contempt of Court in the Presence of the Jury Was 
Prejudicial and Denied Defendant the Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that under the totality 
of the circumstances, the trialjudge's 
continuous interruptions, rulings on 
phantom objections, and arrest of 
defense counsel in the presence of the 
jury, constituted extreme prejudice 
and violated the defendant's right to a 
fair and impartial trial. Johnson v. 
State, 352 Md. 374, 722 A.2d 873 
(1999). The court determined that 
judges should not express their 
personal views in front of the jury 
because of the likelihood of a harmful 
effect on the defendant's rights. 
John Howard Johnson 
("Johnson") was indicted and tried in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
for first degree murder, unlawful use 
of a handgun in the commission of a 
felony, illegally wearing and carrying 
a handgun, and kidnaping. Id at 376, 
722 A.2d at 874. Throughout 
Johnson's trial, the judge and 
Johnson's defense attorney had 
heated disputes. Id. During opening 
statements, the judge interrupted 
defense counsel and threatened him 
with contempt in front of the jury. Id. 
at 376-77,722 A.2d at 874. While 
defense counsel was examining a 
state's witness, the judge began 
interfering with the questioning. Id at 
378-79, 722 A.2d at 875. When 
defense counsel asked the judge to 
stop, the judge had him arrested for 
contempt of court in front of the jury. 
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Id. Once the trial resumed, the judge 
sustained objections never made by 
the State's Attorney. Id at 380-81, 
722 A.2d at 876. At one point, the 
trial judge accused defense counsel of 
stealing a court room marker used to 
identify evidence. Id. at 382, 722 
A.2d at 876-77. The trial judge held 
defense counsel in contempt again, 
this time outside the presence of the 
jury, and once the trial resumed 
defense counsel requested a mistrial. 
Id. at 383, 722 A.2d at 877. The 
judge denied the motion for mistrial, 
and defense counsel informed the 
judge that Johnson was on trial and 
thatthe judge's conduct was interfering 
with Johnson's rightto a fair trial. Id 
at 383-84, 722 A.2d at 877. 
The jury convicted Johnson of 
involuntary manslaughter, illegally 
wearing and carrying a handgun, and 
kidnaping. Johnson did not file a 
timely appeal and, therefore, his first 
appeal was denied. Id. at 376, 722 
A.2d at 874. Johnson was granted 
post-conviction relief in the form of a 
belated second appeal. Id. The court 
of special appeals affirmed his 
convictions. Id. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to determine whether 
Johnson was denied the right to a fair 
and impartial trial as a result of the trial 
judge's conduct in front of the jury. 
Id. 
The court of appeals, noting that 
a criminal defendant's right to a fair 
and impartial trial is a fundamental 
right, guaranteed in all criminal cases, 
stated that an essential component to 
a fair trial is an impartial judge. Id. at 
385, 722 A.2d at 878 (citing 
Johnson-El v. State, 330 Md. at 
105-06, 622 A.2d at 740-41 
(1993)). The court confirmed that 
judges are held to the highest 
standard of conduct because of their 
distinguished position. Id. (citing 
Johnson-El, 330 Md. at 105-06, 
622 A.2d at 740-41). A judge's 
conduct has a direct effect on 
whether a defendant receives a fair 
trial because the judge's opinions will 
usually impact the jury's verdict. Id 
(citingJohnson-EI, 330 Md. at 105-
06,622 A.2d at 740-41.) The court 
concluded that a judge should be 
impartial at all times and should not 
show his or her feelings in front of a 
jury. Id at 386, 722 A.2d at 878 
(citingApplev. State, 190 Md. 661, 
670,59 A.2d 509,513 (1948)). 
The court recognized, however, 
that a trial judge is allowed discretion 
in his or her remarks during trial, as 
long as those remarks do not impair 
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id 
at 386-87, 722 A.2d at 879 (citing 
Bryantv. State, 207 Md. 565, 585, 
115A.2d502,511 (1955)). Ajudge 
who conducts a trial in an "impatient 
and brusque way" does not impair a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. 
(quoting Bryant, 207 Md. at 585, 
115 A.2d at 511). The court held 
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that to obtain a reversal of his 
conviction, a defendant must make 
"some clear showing that the judge's 
statements influenced the jtuy against" 
him. Id. (quoting Bryant, 207 Md. 
at 585,115 A.2d at 511). 
In the instant case, the court of 
appeals took issue with defense 
counsel's arrest for contempt of court 
inthepresenceofthejtuy. Id at387, 
722 A.2d at 879. Without having 
before addressed the impact of 
defense - counsel's arrest on a 
defendant's right to a fair trial, the 
court of appeals looked to Suggs v. 
State, 87 Md. App. 250,257, 589 
A.2d 551,554-55 (1991), where the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, applying a totality of the 
circumstances test, held that the arrest 
of an attorney in the presence of the 
jury, coupled with the judge's poor 
jtuy instruction, was so prejudicial that 
it denied the defendant the right to a 
fair trial. Id. at 387-88, 722 A.2d at 
879. 
The court of appeals also 
examined case law from other 
jurisdictions which had ruled that the 
arrest of defense counsel in the 
presence of the jury denied the 
defendant the right to a fair trial. Id 
at 389-90,722 A.2d 880 (citing Ash 
v. State, 225 P.2d 816,819 (Okla. 
1950); Meek v. State, 930 P.2d 
11 04, 11 09 (Nev. 1996)). The court 
of appeals noted that ')udges have the 
sovereign power to punish, to deprive 
persons of their liberty and property, 
and that alone requires that they 
restrain their irritation." Id at 389, 
722 A.2d at 880 (quoting Scott v. 
State, 110 Md. App. 464, 489, 677 
A.2d 1078, 1090 (1996)). The court 
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concluded that the trial judge's 
continuous attack on defense counsel 
denied the defendant a fair and 
impartial trial. Id. at 389, 393-94, 
722 A.2d at 880, 882. 
In addition to the trial judge's 
ordering the arrest of defense counsel, 
. the court of appeals also considered 
the effect of the trial judge's other 
conduct impacting the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. The court was 
specifically concerned with the 
interruptions, rulings on phantom 
objections, and answering of 
questions before allowing witnesses 
to answer. Id at 390-91, 722 A.2d 
at 881. Although the court had not 
ruled upon the effect of a trialjudge's 
conduct on a defendant's right to a 
fair trial, the court noted that in 
Spencer v. State, 76 Md. App. 71, 
543 A.2d 851 (1988), the court of 
special appeals, applying a totality of 
the circumstances test, held that the 
trial judge's accusation in the presence 
of the jury that defense counsel had 
lied to the court was reversible error 
because it impaired the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Id at 391, 722 
A.2d 881. 
Additionally, other jurisdictions 
have ruled upon the effect of a trial 
judge's conduct on the defendant's 
right to a fair and impartial trial. Id 
For example, a trial judge's continuous 
interruptions and insinuations in front 
of the jury that defense counsel had 
been drinking was prejudicial to the 
defendant and constituted reversible 
error. Id at 391-92, 722 A.2d at 
881 (citing Earl v. Wilson, 904 P.2d 
1029, 1033-34 (Nev. 1995)). 
Moreover, trial judges who verbally 
abuse lawyers and state their personal 
views in the presence of the jury, 
"'destroy the balance of judicial 
impartiality necessary for a fair 
hearing.'" Id at 392, 722 A.2d at 
881 (quoting People v. Wilson, 174 
N.W.2d 914,915-16 (Mich. 1969)). 
Applying this reasoning to the instant 
case, the court of appeals held that 
under the totality of the circumstances, 
the trialjudge's conduct denied the 
defendant his right to a fair and 
impartial trial. 
The holding in Johnson v. State 
stands for the proposition that 
although the defense counsel and trial 
judge may have personal differences, 
the judge should recognize that the 
position he or she holds is of such 
importance to our society that those 
personal differences must be put aside 
during trial. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland is reminding trial judges that 
the defendant, not defense counsel, is 
the one on trial, and that a judge's 
personal feelings toward defense 
counsel should not interfere with the 
defendant's guaranteed right to a fair 
and impartial trial. 
